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The Effect of Priority Date on Price of Temporary Water Rights Transfers
Abstract
This research extends the analysis of De Mouche et al. (2011) and Colby et al. (1993) relating price
differentials in per acre-foot terms to the priority date of water rights and hydrologic conditions using
experimental economic data. This study investigates the effect that priority date, or the year the right was
established, can have on the price of leases in the market for water rights and will expand on the existing
literature by using an experimental data set to test the relationship. It is hypothesized that senior water
rights, those with an older priority date, will have higher prices, while junior water rights, those that have
been more recently established, will have lower prices. A cross-sectional analysis using an Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) model will be conducted to test this hypothesis. If the expected relationship is observed
and found to be significant, this study may have policy implications that could impact decisions to
regulate the market for temporary water rights transfers more strictly in the Western United States.
Ultimately, since water scarcity and water rights are a growing economic and environmental concern in
regions around the globe, extensions of this work may lead to new policies and regulations on a global
level.
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The Effect of Priority Date on Price of
Temporary Water Rights Transfers
Elizabeth Liubicich

I.

Introduction and Background
In the Western Region of the United
States, where water is a scarce resource, various
water-trading schemes, both temporary and
permanent, have been attempted over the years.
Under the Doctrine of Prior Appropriations
(DPA), the property rights regime that was
established in the late 1860s and dominates
the Western half of the U.S., the first user to
claim a source of water and put that water to
beneficial use has the indefinite right to use the
source exclusively. These rights can be inherited
from one generation to another, or transferred
between parties in a marketplace.
Today, more than 100 years after the DPA
was established, the population of the western
region continues to boom at a rate of 2% per
year in urban areas, and agricultural production
in this region is becoming increasingly crucial
to the national economy (DeMouche et al.,
2011). Denser urban populations and intensive
agricultural production both require water,
a limited resource. Increased stress on water
resources in the region have resulted in a need
for trade, but permanent transfers are not
incentivized as there is more value to the original
user in holding the right in perpetuity. Because of
the infeasibility of permanent transfers, markets
for temporary transfers, or leases, of water rights
have been employed in an attempt to meet the
needs of water consumers, primarily agricultural
users. These transfers occur when the permanent
rights holder leases the right to their priority
of use to another user temporarily. A lease
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is beneficial for both parties as it fulfills the
immediate need for water and allows the original
rights holder to profit while still maintaining the
right to use the water in the future (Shupe et al.,
1989).
The term of any individual lease is
negotiable and can range from one month to
several years. Despite growing use of these
markets, they remain inefficient because
little is known about the willingness to pay
of demanders, the willingness to accept
of consumers, priority, and the impact of
environmental and hydrologic conditions on
these factors. The lack of information and
scramble to acquire water rights has resulted
in an array of trade prices over time and across
markets.
De Mouche et al. (2012) investigated
what factors affect the price of temporary water
rights using data from transfers occurring from
1987 to 2005. When urban municipalities were
the consumers the average price of the transfer
is $4400.00 per acre/foot, compared to only
$1700.00 per acre/foot when the resource is
going to crops (De Mouche et al., 2012). This
price discrepancy represents inefficiency in the
market for temporary water rights, a problem
that has occurred because the owners of the
permanent rights do not know the value of the
temporary rights to demanders, and vice versa.
A number of other factors, both environmental
and economic, affect the price of a temporary
water rights transfer in the west. The identity
of the demander plays an important role, as
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does the presence of drought, and the ability of
agricultural demanders to stack multiple leases
and use more than the legal limit of water in
an effort to reap higher yields or produce more
water intensive crops (De Mouche et al., 2011).
The seminal theoretical work on the
subject by Ciriacy-Wantrup (1956) connects
the three major property rights regimes in the
United States, riparian doctrine, appropriative
doctrine, and a third system blending the
features of these two systems, with the economic
concepts of security, transferability, and welfare.
The theoretical analysis in the literature has
been extended to include measures of welfare,
potential third party effects, and suggested
implementation of markets for temporary
transfers of water rights to increase efficiency
(Gould, 1989). Using the principle of use-value,
and assuming that the buyer of a right has a
higher use-value for the right than the seller,
Libecap (2005) offers a more recent refinement
to the theoretical basis for markets for temporary
transfers of water rights under the Doctrine
of Prior Appropriations (DPA) established by
Ciriacy-Wantrup (1956) and Gould (1989). He
suggests that a senior right should have a higher
value because it comes with a greater guarantee
of receiving an allotment of water (Libecap,
2005). It has greater security because the right’s
holder is guaranteed to receive the water they are
entitled to before any junior user via diversion
of the source or a bulk water transfer (Gould,
1989). As Ciriacy-Wantrup (1956) describes,
“under natural conditions a senior appropriative
right is more secure than a junior appropriative
right against physical uncertainty.” The holder
of a junior right may have a higher use-value for
water because of the potential value of their crop
yield, and thus, a higher willingness to pay for
the senior right and security that comes with it.
Because reliability of the right is directly linked
to the right’s priority date, if a right is more
senior, it should receive a higher price in the
market (Libecap, 2005).
Modern water transfers occur using a

number of market mechanisms including water
banks, bulletin board markets, double-auction
markets, derivative markets, environmental
leasing and purchase programs, and
combinations of these systems (Hadjigeorgalis,
2009). However, large transaction costs and
incomplete information result in large price
differentials of temporary water rights transfers
(Colby, et al., 1993; Broadbent et al., 2009; De
Mouche et al., 2011). These same factors impede
the markets in general and have resulted in few
traded rights (De Mouche et al., 2011). While
scholars have used real data and found that
price differentials observed in the markets exist
because of priority dates (De Mouche et al., 2011;
Colby et al., 1993), transaction size, and various
additional buyer, seller, and environmental
characteristics, data limitations remain a chief
concern (De Mouche et al., 2011; Bjornlund and
Rossini, 2005).
Because real transaction data is in short
supply, water resources, and environmental
economists have relied on experimental
economics methods to test their hypotheses
regarding the temporary transfer of water rights.
Over the past two decades hypothetical markets
have been coupled with hydrologic models in an
attempt to determine whether parties engaged
in each transaction, the direction of the trade,
the size of the transaction measured in acre-feet,
and the impact on the physical system affect the
price of the transfer (Broadbent et al., 2009). In
accordance with the theoretical developments of
Gould (1989) and Libecap (2005), Broadbent et
al. (2009) finds that regardless of the identity of
the buyer, more trades of larger overall quantity
occurred when the meteorological conditions
of the region were drier and the supply of water
was more uncertain. An empirical study in
Australia, another hotbed of water resource
allocation issues, yielded similar results, showing
agricultural users utilized the market more
heavily when low precipitation was expected,
and that higher overall prices were observed
for farmers with higher use-values (i.e., dairy
farmers) (Brooks and Harris, 2008).
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This research extends the analysis of De
Mouche et al. (2011) and Colby et al. (1993)
relating price differentials in per acre-foot terms
to the priority date of water rights and hydrologic
conditions using experimental economic data.
This study investigates the effect that priority
date, or the year the right was established, can
have on the price of leases in the market for
water rights and will expand on the existing
literature by using an experimental data set to
test the relationship. It is hypothesized that senior
water rights, those with an older priority date,
will have higher prices, while junior water rights,
those that have been more recently established,
will have lower prices. A cross-sectional analysis
using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model
will be conducted to test this hypothesis. If the
expected relationship is observed and found
to be significant, this study may have policy
implications that could impact decisions
to regulate the market for temporary water
rights transfers more strictly in the Western
United States. Ultimately, since water scarcity
and water rights are a growing economic and
environmental concern in regions around the
globe, extensions of this work may lead to new
policies and regulations on a global level. The
remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section two describes the experimental data
and methodology used to test the relationship
between price per-acre foot, priority date, and
four additional explanatory variables. Section
three discusses the results of the regression
analysis and the fourth section discusses the
implications of the relationship between priority
date and price in markets for temporary water
transfers in systems operating under the DPA.
II.

Data and Methods
An experiment conducted at Illinois
Wesleyan University (IWU) in 2012 provided
the data set used to test the hypothesis that
priority dates are positively related to the price of
temporary water transfers. Dr. Craig Broadbent
conducted the experiment over a four-week
period in the fall of 2012. Thirteen Senior
Economics students were paid a $50.00 show up
60

fee, which they could add to through engaging in
market transactions. Eleven students represented
rights holders and engaged in the market and
two students served as alternates. One student
represented a senior water rights holder, meaning
their right to the source was established in 1869.
Eight students represented junior rights holders,
meaning their rights were established in 1870,
1880, 1893, or 1894. One student represented a
residential user, and the last student represented
a supplemental well, or a surplus reserve of water
for residential users.
During the first week of the experiment,
the students were given background information
about the DPA. They were introduced to the
software used to conduct the trades, which
was developed by Dr. Broadbent’s research
team at the Sandia National Laboratories and
the University of Texas. The students also
participated in a similar type of experimental
economics activity during week two, in order to
gain a better understanding of the purpose of the
study and to grasp the procedure of what they
would be doing in the following weeks.
During weeks three and four the actual
experiments were conducted. Experiments one
and two were conducted in week three and
simulated a situation in which there was a call
on the water source. A call occurs in times of
drought, usually during the summer months,
and is when a senior user indicates that they have
not received their allotment of water and places
a “call” which stops junior users from diverting
water. In experiment one, a call on the source
of water occurred during the months of June
and July, impacting 7 of the 44 accepted trades.
In experiment two, a call occurred during June
only, and affected 6 of the 45 accepted trades.
Experiments three and four were conducted in
the final week and simulated a situation in which
stacking was allowed. Stacking is the ability of
agricultural users to irrigate their land with more
than the legally allotted volume of water per acre,
currently 2.7 acre-feet of water per acre over the
growing season. When stacking was allowed,
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every trade in the experiment received a 1 for
stacking. In experiment three, a call occurred, in
addition to stacking, during the months of July
and August with 12 of the 51 accepted trades in
this experiment affected. These two conditions
were included in the experimental model in
order to gauge the effect of hydrologic conditions
on the price of temporary water transfers.
The data from these four experiments
is cross-sectional and yielded 201 accepted
temporary transfers with a fixed term of one
month. Experiment one produced 44 trades,
experiment two yielded 45 accepted trades,
experiment three produced 51 accepted trades,
and experiment four yielded 61 trades for a total
of 201 trades. For each individual trade, the
seller’s name, the buyer’s name, the total price
paid in U.S. Dollars, and the quantity, measured
as the number of acre-feet traded was recorded.
The price per acre-foot was calculated from the
recorded information for each accepted transfer
by dividing the total price paid from the buyer
to the seller in U.S. Dollars by the total number
of acre-feet traded. Five dummy variables were
created and recorded to indicate the month of a
call, if stacking was allowed, and the type of trade
that occurred (i.e. senior to junior user, junior
to junior user, or agricultural user to residential
user). Trades were given a value of one if the
factors measured by the dummy variables were
present or applicable to the trade, so, if a call
occurred, a trade was given a value of one for the
call variable. There are three potential categories
for the type of trade: senior agricultural user to
junior agricultural user trades, junior agricultural
user to junior agricultural user trades, and
agricultural user, which can be senior or junior
users, to residential user trades. For any given
trade, only one of these categories is applicable,
so the trades received a one for the dummy
variable measuring the category in which they
best fit and a zero for all other dummy variables
excluding junior to junior trades.
The average price per acre-foot across all
201 accepted trades is $3.71. The maximum price

per acre-foot in an accepted trade was $7.00, and
the minimum was $2.00. For each priority date,
there is a wide dispersion of prices per acre-foot.
Most trades were accepted at a price per acrefoot of $2.00 to $5.00, with a few outliers that
occurred at $6.00 or $7.00 per acre-foot. The
general trend is that in trades from senior users
and higher priority date junior users, the prices
per acre-foot are higher, as pictured in Figure 1 in
Appendix A. The average price of trades of 1869
priority date rights is $4.02; for trades of rights
with an 1870 priority date the average price is
$4.38. The prices for the three more junior dates,
1880, 1893, and 1894 averaged at $3.76, $3.55,
and $3.28, respectively.
An Ordinary Least Squares Regression
(OLS) in Eviews software was used to test this
hypothesis and determine the relationship
between price per acre-foot (price per quantity)
and the priority date of the water right. Equation
1 shows the model with price per acre-foot as the
dependent variable, and priority date, occurrence
of a call, presence of stacking, senior to junior
user trade, and agricultural to residential user
trade as the independent variables. Trades
occurring between any agricultural user,
regardless of seniority, to either the residential
user or the supplemental well were given a value
of one for agricultural to residential trades. The
expected relationship between these variables,
summarized in Table 1 in Appendix A, is positive
for priority date, meaning that the older the
water right, the higher the price paid, positive for
a call, negative for stacking, positive for Senior
to Junior trades, and negative for Agricultural to
Residential user trades.
Equation 1:
Price Per Acre-Foot = α +β1(Priority Date)+
β2(Call) + β3(Stacking) +β4(Senior to Junior) +
β5(Agricultural User to Residential User) + e
Results
The empirical model tests the relationship
between prices per acre-foot of temporarily
III.
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transferred water rights and the priority date
of the right being traded (Equation 1). Four
additional variables are included in the model.
Occurrence of a call, stacking, and two dummy
variables which capture the nature of the trading
parties and gauge the effect of the identities
of the traders on price per acre-foot. The first
is senior user to junior user and the second is
agricultural user to residential user transactions.
For both variables, a value of one indicates that
the trade falls into the category of the trade
that is measured by the variable. Thus, the final
expression is given in equation 1. Using the
cumulative data from all four of the individual
experiments, or trading rounds, an Ordinary
Least Squares regression produced the expected
results, summarized in Table 2 in Appendix A.
The estimated coefficient for priority
date was negative, which is consistent with
the predicted outcome as a lower numbered
year (i.e., 1860) is more senior than a higher
numbered year (i.e., 1893) (De Mouche et al,
2011). The relationship observed is a direct
relationship indicating that earlier years or
older rights demand higher prices per acre-foot.
Additionally, a dummy variable was included
to denote trades occurring between the senior
user, whose right was established in 1869, and
any of the various junior users. The sign for the
coefficient indicating a senior to junior transfers
was positive, indicating that a senior to junior
trade earned a higher price per acre-foot than a
trade between two junior users.
The magnitude of the coefficients for each
of these variables was small, 0.0199 and 0.4641,
respectively. For a one-year decrease in seniority,
the price per acre-foot falls by about $0.02.
The most senior right was established in 1869,
and the most junior, in 1894, so, the predicted
difference in price between the most senior
and most junior rights is approximately $0.50.
Similarly, the difference in price between a senior
to junior transfer and a transfer between junior
uses is $0.46. It is crucial to consider that in this
set of experimental data, the average price per
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acre-foot was $3.73. The impact of seniority on
price is 12.3% of the average price.
As expected, the presence of a call,
captured through a dummy variable, was
positively related to the price per quantity.
The coefficient for this variable, 0.3202, was
significant at the 1% level. This result is not
surprising because when there is a shortage of a
scarce resource such as water, the price of that
resource, in this case the per acre-foot, rises.
Stacking, an indicator of a surplus of water at a
particular water source had the opposite impact
on the price of one-month temporary transfers.
Stacking was also indicated by a dummy variable
in the same fashion as the call variable. This
coefficient, -0.2230, indicated that the presence
of stacking resulted in a decrease in the price
per acre-foot of water of $0.22. In essence, this
indicates that there is not as great of a need to
trade water rights in times of surplus because it is
likely that all users, even those most junior, will
gain access to the water that they need regardless
of priority. If rights holders are trading to new
users who have never before held their own
water rights, the price demanded will remain
low because there is more competition to lease
that right and rights holders with no use for
the water may undercut other rights holders in
order to transfer their right and avoid losing it
under the DPA’s beneficial use clause. Transfers
between agricultural users and residential users
in which the residential user purchases the right
resulted in a negative coefficient of -0.3939,
indicating that when water is transferred from an
agricultural user to a residential user it sells for
less than agricultural to agricultural trades.
The adjusted R squared for this regression
was .3536, indicating that approximately 35.4%
of the variation in price per acre-foot across
transactions was explained by these five factors.
The F-statistic for the regression is 22.8842 and
is significant at the 1% level indicating that as
a group these explanatory variables are able to
explain the variance in price per acre-foot.

The Park Place Economist, Volume XXII

Liubicich
IV.

Conclusions
This paper examines the relationship
between the price of temporary water rights
transfers and the priority date of the right in
order to extend the body of literature that seeks
to influence the design and regulation of water
leasing markets and to provide fuller information
to buyers and sellers. Using an Ordinary
Least Squares regression, this study tests the
relationship between the price, in dollars, per
acre-foot of water traded in an experimental
market and the priority date of the right. Four
additional explanatory variables were used: the
presence of a call, stacking, and the parties that
the transfer occurs between, senior to junior
transfers, and agricultural user to residential user
transfers.
The results of the regression were
consistent with the predicted outcomes. Each
of the coefficients for the five independent
variables was significant at a high level and had
the predicted sign. Priority date was observed
to be correlated with price in an inverse fashion,
which, considering that the actual year was used
in each observation for the variable, means that
the older or more senior a right, the higher the
price it will sell for. This is consistent with the
literature on the topic that suggests the more
secure, less risky senior rights will sell at higher
prices because the purchasing party is willing
to pay more for a lower risk of not receiving the
water they purchased, even in times of drought.
The results of this regression, which
show with a high degree of certainty that senior
water rights held under the Doctrine of Prior
Appropriations will command higher prices
than their junior counterparts when traded
temporarily for a period of one month, could
be used to inform buyers and sellers in similar
markets in the western United States. With
more complete information about the effects
of seniority and environmental conditions on
the demand and willingness to pay for water
rights, sellers and buyers should be able to
come to an agreement on price more quickly.
In turn, this increased efficiency could increase

the number of trades that occur making these
markets a reasonable solution for the problem of
water allocation in the West. The results of this
research may also be used by regulatory agencies
to set prices or restrictions in the markets in an
effort to increase efficiency and improve water
allocation.
The results of this study can be used as
the groundwork for more extensive research
into the impact of priority on price in the face of
other external conditions. With more extensive
experimental data, additional scenarios could
be tested to better understand the market for
temporary water transfers. In this experiment,
the term of the lease was fixed at one month and
was non-negotiable. Giving the players in the
experiment the freedom to decide to buy or sell
the rights for longer periods of time would allow
future researchers to test whether or not seniority
has an effect on the length of the lease negotiated,
and if the length of the lease has an impact on the
price per acre-foot per month. A second option
for further research would be to jointly test the
impact of variables such as seniority and a call
or seniority and stacking using a multivariate
analysis. More extensive data is required to run
such a test as this experiment contained only a
handful of observations that would have met the
necessary criteria. Finally, further extensions of
this research could include testing the impact
of priority date on the price of permanent
transfers of the right. Admittedly, a number of
practical problems would present themselves
in a permanent transfer situation because there
is no incentive to sell a right that you could
otherwise lease month after month or year after
year to produce a steady stream of income if you
hold the most senior right. However, such an
experiment may provide insight into the transfer
of rights between junior users or between current
rights holders and parties that do not currently
own the rights to a water source.
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Appendix

Table 1: Expected signs
Variable
Priority
Call (1 = call; 0 = no call)
Agricultural to Residential User (1 = agricultural to residential user; 0 = no)
Stacking (1 = stacking; 0 = no stacking)
Senior to Junior (1 = Senior to Junior user;
0 = no)

Expected Sign
+
+
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Table 2: Estimation Results of the relationship between
price per acre-foot and priority date
Variable
Coefficient
Priority
-0.0199***
(4.6014)
Call (1 = call; 0 = no call)
0.3202***
(2.7479)
Agricultural to Residential User (1 = agri-0.3909***
cultural to residential user; 0 = no)
(4.3044)
Stacking (1 = stacking; 0 = no stacking)
-0.2230**
(2.5447)
Senior to Junior (1 = Senior to Junior user;
0.4641***
0 = no)
(2.6837)
Adjusted R-Squared
0.3536
F-Statistic
22.884**
Values in parentheses are absolute
statistics
***Significant at the 1% level
**Significant at the 5% level
*Significant at the 10% level
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